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Does smallpox still exist today?

Does smallpox still exist today?

The ghost of humanity's greatest scourge

Yet, in a monumental triumph of international public health, science achieved the unthinkable: smallpox was driven completely into extinction in the wild. The last naturally occurring case of smallpox on planet Earth was diagnosed in Somalia in October 1977. Following intensive global vaccination, tracking, and containment efforts led by the World Health Organization (WHO), the global eradication of the disease was officially certified in 1980. To this day, smallpox remains the first and only human infectious disease to be totally eradicated through deliberate human intervention.

Given this historic victory, a common question echoes through modern classrooms and public health forums: Does smallpox still exist today?

The short answer is both reassuring and deeply unsettling: while smallpox no longer circulates among human populations or exists in nature, it is not entirely gone. Viable, living samples of the variola virus are still very much in existence, carefully guarded under maximum-security locks. This first part of our exploration digs into the historical weight of the disease, the mechanics of its eradication, and the paradoxical reality of why the virus was kept alive instead of being completely destroyed.

The historical shadow and the anatomy of eradication

To understand why smallpox samples were preserved, one must first appreciate how uniquely vulnerable the virus was to targeted elimination. Smallpox is caused exclusively by the variola virus, a pathogen that infects only human beings. Unlike many other dangerous infectious diseases—such as influenza, rabies, or West Nile virus, smallpox has no animal reservoirs or vector insects like mosquitoes that can harbor, maintain, and quietly reintroduce the pathogen back into human populations. There are no monkeys, rodents, or birds walking around with variola.

Smallpox possessed distinct clinical characteristics that made it uniquely trackable. Infected individuals always developed overt, easily recognizable physical symptoms, most notably the distinct, blistering facial rash. There were no asymptomatic carriers walking around spreading the disease unknowingly; a person was typically too sick and bedridden to travel long distances while actively contagious. These epidemiological traits allowed health workers to deploy a brilliant strategy known as ring vaccination, tracking down every single individual who came into contact with an infected patient and immunizing their immediate social "ring" to choke off the virus's path of transmission before it could spread further.

When the global eradication campaign crossed the finish line in 1980, the international scientific community faced a profound ethical and practical dilemma. What should be done with the remaining stockpiles of the deadly virus?

The official repositories: Where the Virus lives today

Instead of ordering the immediate incineration of every remaining sample, the World Health Organization made the contentious decision to consolidate the world's known, legal supplies of the variola virus into strictly controlled maximum-containment laboratories. The rationale at the time was clear: science had conquered the disease, but it had not yet fully unlocked all of its biological secrets. Researchers argued that keeping small, tightly monitored quantities of live virus was essential for developing advanced antiviral medications, designing next-generation safer vaccines, and building ultra-sensitive diagnostic tools in case the virus ever re-emerged or was weaponized.

Today, under strict international oversight and regular inspections by the World Health Organization's biosafety teams, official and legal stocks of the live variola virus are restricted to only two designated reference laboratories in the entire world:

  1. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) located in Atlanta, Georgia, United States.

  2. The Russian State Centre for Research on Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) located in Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Region, Russian Federation.

These facilities operate under astonishingly rigorous safety protocols, featuring multiple layers of physical security, negative-pressure air filtration systems, specialized hazmat suit protocols, and continuous international auditing. Every single experiment conducted on the virus within these walls must be approved in advance by the WHO's Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research to ensure it serves a critical global public health interest.

The ongoing debate: Science versus security

The decision to preserve these repository samples has sparked decades of fierce ethical and geopolitical debate. On one side of the argument, public health officials and virologists contend that retaining the virus is a vital insurance policy. They point out that antiviral drugs, such as tecovirimat (TPOXX), and updated vaccines must be tested and refined. Because natural human smallpox infections no longer occur, researchers cannot conduct standard clinical efficacy trials in human populations; instead, they rely on laboratory research using these stored samples and advanced animal models to ensure humanity is never caught defenseless.

On the other side, critics and various international delegations have repeatedly argued that keeping live smallpox stock is an unnecessary and unacceptable global risk. The argument against retention is straightforward: as long as live variola virus exists anywhere on Earth, there is a non-zero risk of accidental laboratory escape, insider theft, or illicit replication. With modern advancements in synthetic biology and gene-synthesis technology, the physical virus is no longer the sole security threat; the genetic blueprint of smallpox is fully mapped and publicly accessible in scientific databases.

Occasional accidental discoveries of forgotten historical vials in university or government research freezers, such as incidents in the United States, serve as stark reminders that historical samples can sometimes elude strict inventory controls, heightening anxieties about global biological security.

To continue exploring the reality of smallpox today:

The ongoing debate over total eradication

While naturally occurring smallpox was successfully eradicated through a massive, coordinated global vaccination campaign led by the World Health Organization (WHO), culminating in the last known case in Somalia in 1977 and official global certification in 1980, the question of whether the virus truly still exists is met with a nuanced reality.

As a circulating human pathogen causing widespread disease and death, smallpox is gone. However, physical samples of the variola virus, the causative agent of the disease, strictly survive under maximum security lock and key.

Where the remaining stocks are kept

To prevent the total loss of the virus for scientific reference while mitigating public health risks, the WHO authorized only two official, highly secure repositories to retain live stocks of the variola virus for ongoing research purposes:

  1. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, United States.

  2. The State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) in Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Region, Russian Federation.

These repositories are subject to rigorous, periodic international inspections by WHO biosafety and biosecurity teams to ensure absolute containment, compliance, and safety. The primary goals of maintaining these minimal, guarded strains are to develop advanced antiviral medications, improve next-generation diagnostic tests, and formulate safer vaccines in the event of an unforeseen emergency or synthetic recreation threat.

The scientific and security dilemma

The continued existence of these official stocks has sparked decades of intense ethical and scientific debate. On one side, researchers argue that keeping the live virus is essential for medical preparedness. Because future antiviral drugs and vaccines cannot ethically be tested on humans infected with active smallpox, scientists rely on laboratory models and animal testing equivalents using these strains to ensure the global community is never left defenseless.

Conversely, public health advocates and various international delegations have repeatedly called for the complete destruction of the remaining stocks. Their arguments center on catastrophic risk: no matter how stringent the biosafety protocols are, the possibility of accidental laboratory leakage, human error, or security breaches remains a terrifying nonzero probability. Advancements in synthetic biology mean that the genetic sequence of the variola virus is publicly mapped; critics worry that keeping physical stocks is redundant if the virus could theoretically be pieced together digitally by malicious actors.

A Legacy of Vigilance

Smallpox exists today as a ghost of medical history locked behind high-security containment and as a permanent reminder of what unified global science can achieve. While everyday populations no longer live under the shadow of its epidemics and routine vaccinations have long ceased, international health bodies maintain constant vigilance. The eradication of smallpox remains humanity's greatest public health triumph, but the management of its final surviving vials ensures that the chapter on smallpox preparedness remains permanently open.