You’d think the Oracle of Omaha would’ve scooped up Alphabet shares the moment they looked undervalued. But he didn’t. Not really. There’s a twist involving one of his deputies, a side bet through a subsidiary, and a quiet retreat when clarity hit. Let’s unpack this.
Buffett’s Philosophy and Tech: A Mismatch in Timing and Temperament?
Value investing. That’s Buffett’s gospel. Buy businesses you understand, with durable moats, run by competent management, at a reasonable price. He skipped Amazon for years. Avoided Microsoft during its 1990s explosion. Tech, in his view, was a minefield of hype and obsolescence. “I don’t know who’s going to win,” he once said, “and that’s why I don’t play.” That’s not fear—it’s discipline.
Google emerged in 1998. By 2004, it went public. Fast growth. Massive margins. Dominant market share in search. The data was screaming opportunity. Yet Buffett stayed out. He admitted later he “underestimated” Google’s economic power. But here’s the thing: it wasn’t ignorance. It was a conscious decision to stay within his circle of competence. He didn’t fully grasp the scalability of algorithms or the lock-in effect of data networks. And that’s fair. Not knowing is honest. Pretending otherwise gets investors burned.
But—and this is where it gets interesting—his team didn’t freeze entirely. While Buffett held firm, one of his investment managers at Berkshire did something quietly bold.
The 1 Million Gamble: Todd Combs and the 2013 Stake
In late 2013, regulatory filings revealed a new position: 500,000 shares of Google—later adjusted to Class C—worth roughly $341 million at the time. The buyer? Not Buffett personally. Not even Berkshire in the main portfolio. It was Todd Combs, one of the two lead investment managers handpicked to eventually succeed Buffett.
Combs had joined Berkshire in 2010, tasked with managing a portion of its equity portfolio. His mandate: find opportunities Buffett might overlook. Tech was fair game. And Combs saw something Buffett didn’t—or wouldn’t admit to seeing. He believed Google wasn’t just a search engine. It was an advertising monopoly disguised as a utility. YouTube, Android, Gmail—all feeding data into a machine that could target consumers better than any billboard, TV ad, or direct mailer ever could.
Why Combs Saw What Buffett Didn’t
Generational lens matters. Combs, born in 1971, grew up with the internet. Buffett, born in 1930, learned investing from Benjamin Graham’s “Security Analysis,” a book written before transistors were common. Combs didn’t need to “understand” Google’s code—he just needed to grasp its economics. And those were undeniable: 90%+ share in search advertising, operating margins near 30%, and revenues doubling every few years. It fit a modified value model—one that accounted for platform dominance.
But—and this is critical—Combs didn’t go all in. Half a million shares sounds big. But in the context of Berkshire’s $100+ billion equity portfolio? A rounding error. It was a test. A toe in the water. And Berkshire never increased the position significantly. In fact, by 2016, it was gone. Why?
The Disposition: Why Berkshire Dumped Google Shares
Simple: valuation. By 2015, Google’s stock had nearly tripled from Combs’ entry point. P/E ratios crept into the high 20s—rich, even for a company printing cash like a central bank. Plus, Alphabet was restructuring, creating a “moonshots” division (now called X) that burned billions on experiments like self-driving cars and longevity research. Buffett hates vague capital allocation. “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics,” he said once, “it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.”
And that’s exactly where the problem lay. Google wasn’t just Google anymore. It was Alphabet: a holding company with a profitable core and a gallery of speculative ventures. That changed the risk profile. Combs likely exited because the margin of safety vanished. Buffett, watching from the sidelines, probably nodded in quiet approval. The trade wasn’t a failure. It was a lesson executed: buy undervalued certainty, sell when priced for perfection.
Buffett vs. Bezos vs. Brin: Contrasting Tech Philosophies
Let’s compare. Jeff Bezos built Amazon from scratch—no Buffett-style moat at first, just relentless reinvestment. Larry Page and Sergey Brin built Google on algorithmic superiority and data aggregation. Buffett? He buys cash cows—Coca-Cola, American Express, BNSF Railway. The contrast is stark.
Warren’s Indirect Tech Bets That Actually Worked
Here’s a twist: Buffett didn’t buy Google, but he did invest heavily in Apple—the company that makes the hardware Googlers rely on. Berkshire began buying Apple shares in 2016. By 2023, it owned over 900 million shares, worth more than $110 billion. That stake now represents over 40% of Berkshire’s equity portfolio. And Apple pays dividends. It buys back stock. It has pricing power. All Buffett catnip.
And Apple is deeply intertwined with Google. Alphabet pays Apple—yes, Apple—over $20 billion annually to be the default search engine on Safari. That’s a backdoor Google investment. So while Buffett claims he doesn’t own Google, he profits from it every day through Apple. That’s irony with a 10% annual yield.
Why Not Just Buy Google Directly?
Because control matters. Apple’s ecosystem is visible. Its brand loyalty is measurable. Google’s dominance? It’s invisible. You don’t “use” Google. You breathe it. And that intangibility unsettles traditional value investors. How do you assess risk when your product depends on algorithm updates, antitrust scrutiny, and ad-blocker trends?
Frequently Asked Questions
Did Warren Buffett ever invest in Google?
Not directly. Berkshire Hathaway never built a meaningful position in Google. The firm briefly held a small stake through Todd Combs, but it was sold within a few years. Buffett himself has admitted he was “too dumb” to buy Google early, a rare moment of humility from the Omaha sage.
How much did Berkshire pay for its Google shares?
Based on SEC filings from Q4 2013, Berkshire acquired approximately 500,000 shares at an average price of around $682 per share—Class A, though later adjusted due to stock splits. Total cost: about $341 million. For context, that’s less than 0.3% of Berkshire’s portfolio at the time.
Does Buffett regret not buying more Google stock?
He hasn’t said so outright. But in a 2018 interview, he admitted that not buying Amazon was his “biggest mistake.” He didn’t mention Google, but the sentiment is implied. Still, he stands by his philosophy: “It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.” Google, in his later years, stopped looking like a bargain.
The Bottom Line
Warren Buffett didn’t buy Google stock for any significant sum. The $341 million stake was Combs’ call, short-lived and symbolic. And that’s the real takeaway: Buffett’s discipline is his edge, not omniscience. He missed Google, Amazon, Meta—but avoided countless blowups, too. We’re far from it in thinking every missed bet is a failure.
Some will say he’s outdated. I find that overrated. Markets evolve. So do investors. But timeless principles—margin of safety, understanding your business, avoiding speculation—don’t expire. Buffett didn’t need Google to build a $700 billion empire. He used what worked.
Could he have made more? Sure. But should he have? That’s a different question. And that’s exactly where personal conviction beats consensus. You don’t need to chase every rocket ship. Sometimes, the best move is the one you don’t make.
Honestly, it is unclear whether Google would’ve survived Buffett’s ownership style. He’d likely have pressured Alphabet to spin off its moonshots, return more cash, and focus solely on search. Would that have killed innovation? Possibly. And that changes everything when you value growth over dividends.
In the end, the question “How much did Warren Buffett buy Google stock for?” answers itself: not enough to matter. But the story behind the number? That’s priceless.