YOU MIGHT ALSO LIKE
ASSOCIATED TAGS
approval  british  canadian  enbridge  energy  federal  gateway  government  nations  northern  pipeline  political  project  regulatory  trudeau  
LATEST POSTS

The Death Certificate of Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Pipeline: Who Canceled the Most Controversial Energy Project in Canadian History?

The Death Certificate of Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Pipeline: Who Canceled the Most Controversial Energy Project in Canadian History?

The Anatomy of a Line: What Was the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project?

To understand the magnitude of this collapse, we have to look at what Calgary-based Enbridge Inc. actually proposed back when oil prices were comfortably hovering above a hundred dollars a barrel. This was not just another ditch in the ground. The plan called for twin pipelines stretching 1,178 kilometers from the heart of the Alberta oil sands in Bruderheim all the way to the deep-water port of Kitimat on the pristine British Columbia coast. One 36-inch pipe would carry 525,000 barrels per day of diluted bitumen westward for export to hungry Asian markets. The other, a smaller 20-inch line, would pump 193,000 barrels per day of toxic condensate eastward to thin out the heavy sludge coming out of the ground. People don't think about this enough: it was a bi-directional risk landscape cutting through some of the most rugged, unstable terrain on the planet.

The Kitimat Conundrum and the Great Bear Rainforest

The geography was a logistical nightmare disguised as an economic jackpot. Kitimat sits at the head of the Douglas Channel, a narrow, twisting fiord characterized by treacherous currents, frequent squalls, and blinding winter snowstorms. To get the bitumen to international markets, massive Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) would have to navigate these constricted waters, dodging islands and shallow channels. The terminal itself bordered the Great Bear Rainforest, a globally unique ecosystem home to the rare, white Spirit bear. The thought of supertankers loaded with heavy oil maneuvering through these jagged coastal waters terrified local communities. One mistake, one mechanical failure on a stormy November night, and the pristine coastline of northern British Columbia would be irrevocably altered, yet Enbridge treated these worries like minor engineering inconveniences.

A Capitalist Pipe Dream Fueled by High Crude Prices

The economic justification for the project seemed bulletproof on paper during the boom years of the early 2010s. Canadian producers were suffering from a severe case of market discount, selling their Western Canadian Select (WCS) at a massive markdown compared to West Texas Intermediate (WTI) because they were trapped in a single-buyer monopoly with the United States. Diversifying to Asia was the holy grail of Calgary’s oil patch. Enbridge promised that opening this gateway would inject billions into the Canadian economy, creating thousands of construction jobs and generating massive tax revenues for provincial coffers. But where it gets tricky is that the entire financial model was built on the assumption that oil prices would stay sky-high forever, a delusion that blew up in everyone’s face when the global market crashed in 2014.

The Regulatory War and the Joint Review Panel Overreach

The regulatory saga officially kicked off in 2010 when the project was referred to an independent Joint Review Panel (JRP) managed by the National Energy Board and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. For four grueling years, this panel became the battleground for the future of the Canadian resource economy. It was an exhausting circus of technical filings, emotional public hearings, and fierce cross-examinations. When the JRP finally released its report in December 2013, it dropped a bombshell by recommending approval of the project, albeit with 209 stringent environmental and technical conditions. Stephen Harper’s Conservative government eagerly rubber-stamped the approval in June 2014, thinking the battle was won, but they were far from it.

The Illusion of Consultation and the Gitxaala Catalyst

The federal approval was a masterclass in bureaucratic box-ticking that fundamentally ignored the real law of the land. Did the Harper government truly believe they could push a project of this scale through unceded Indigenous territory by simply holding a few town hall meetings? Apparently so. The Gitxaala Nation, alongside the Coastal First Nations coalition, looked at the 209 conditions and saw a complete failure of the crown’s constitutional obligations. They refused to be bought off with promises of pipeline monitoring jobs or community center funding. The issue remains that the government treated consultation as a public relations exercise rather than a deep, meaningful dialogue between sovereign nations.

The Legal Ticking Time Bomb of Section 35

This is where the corporate strategy completely unraveled. Under Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, the Crown has an absolute, non-negotiable duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples before approving projects that could impact their traditional territories. The legal threshold isn't just about letting people speak at a microphone; it requires a reciprocal, good-faith effort to alter the project based on those concerns. Enbridge and the federal lawyers assumed that the JRP process satisfied this requirement. It was a catastrophic miscalculation. The legal teams for the First Nations were quietly building an airtight case, documenting every time their oral evidence was ignored, every map that was dismissed, and every explicit warning about cultural survival that was filed away in some Ottawa basement.

The Federal Court of Appeal Delivers the Lethal Blow

The real climax of this story happened on June 30, 2016. In a monumental 2-to-1 decision in the case of Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the Harper government’s approval of the Northern Gateway pipeline. The court ruled that the federal government had offered only "brief, hurried, and generic" consultation during the final phases of the review process. It was a devastating judicial scolding. The judges explicitly stated that Ottawa had failed to engage in meaningful dialogue, turning what should have been a sacred constitutional duty into an administrative farce. The project was effectively dead right then and there. The court sent the whole mess back to the federal cabinet for reconsideration, giving the newly elected Liberal government a perfect, legally padded exit strategy.

The Trudeau Declaration: Political Execution or Bureaucratic Formality?

So, when Justin Trudeau stood before the cameras on November 29, 2016, and officially announced that his cabinet was directing the National Energy Board to reject the project, he wasn't being a courageous environmental savior. He was just a politician reading the room and executing a corpse. The court had already done the heavy lifting. Trudeau’s announcement was paired with the introduction of a formal moratorium on crude oil tankers along British Columbia’s northern coast, which effectively locked the door and threw away the key. Honestly, it's unclear if Trudeau would have had the political stomach to cancel the pipeline if the Federal Court of Appeal hadn't handed him the decision on a silver platter. That changes everything about how we view his climate legacy, doesn't it?

The Tanker Ban Moratorium as the Ultimate Deadbolt

The introduction of the Oil Tanker Moratorium Act, which later became Bill C-48, was the final nail in the coffin. This legislation prohibited oil tankers carrying more than 12,500 metric tons of crude or persistent oil from stopping or unloading at ports along BC's northern coast, stretching from the Alaska border down to Vancouver Island. It was a brilliant, devastatingly simple legislative maneuver. Even if Enbridge somehow managed to re-engineer the pipeline, re-consult with dozens of furious First Nations, and secure a new regulatory approval, they could no longer legally load the bitumen onto ships. The pipeline became a bridge to nowhere, an expensive line on a map that could never connect to its intended market.

Two Paths Diverged: Northern Gateway vs. The Trans Mountain Expansion

To fully grasp who canceled the Northern Gateway pipeline, you have to contrast its fate with Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain expansion project. Why did one pipeline die while the other survived, eventually being nationalized by the federal government for $4.5 billion? The answer lies in the structural differences of their routes and corporate approaches. Trans Mountain was an expansion of an existing pipeline right-of-way that had been operating since 1953, meaning it cut through a landscape that had already been industrialized for over half a century. Enbridge, by contrast, was trying to blast a brand-new corridor through pristine, untouched wilderness and unceded territories that had never seen a major industrial project. It was an entirely different risk profile.

The Arrogance of Enbridge vs. Kinder Morgan’s Tactical Retreat

Enbridge’s corporate culture at the time did them no favors. Fresh off the disastrous 2010 Kalamazoo River oil spill in Michigan—where one of their lines dumped over three million liters of crude into a major US waterway—the company swaggered into British Columbia with a tone-blind public relations campaign that alienated locals. They treated opposition as an educational problem, assuming that if they just explained the engineering clearly enough, the stubborn locals would fall in line. I watched them alienate natural allies through sheer institutional hubris. Kinder Morgan, while facing intense opposition of their own, recognized much earlier that the legal and political risk in BC was existential, which explains why they ultimately forced the federal government to buy them out rather than sinking more capital into a losing battle. Enbridge kept doubling down on a broken hand until the judges took their cards away.

Common mistakes and misconceptions about the project cancellation

Most armchair analysts point a single, accusatory finger at Justin Trudeau. They believe his 2016 cabinet decree was the sole blade that decapitated the project. Except that this narrative completely ignores a massive legal earthquake that occurred months earlier. The Federal Court of Appeal actually dealt the fatal blow in June 2016, quashing the previous government's approval because the Crown failed to meaningfully consult affected First Nations. Trudeau merely chose not to appeal that judicial decision, burying a project that was already legally brain-dead.

The myth of purely environmental opposition

We often swallow the oversimplified trope that eco-activists in kayaks single-handedly stopped the heavy oil infrastructure. They did not. The problem is that the real resistance was grounded in First Nations legal jurisdiction and constitutional rights, not just environmental sentiment. The Gitxaala, Coastal First Nations, and Heiltsuk Nations launched sophisticated legal challenges based on Section 35 of the Constitution Act. This was an unyielding wall of indigenous jurisprudence. The eco-protests provided the media noise, yet the legal framework of Aboriginal title is what actually stripped the project of its viability.

Blaming market dynamics alone

Did global economics kill the venture? Some financial pundits argue that the collapse of oil prices in late 2014 made the multi-billion-dollar infrastructure obsolete. But let's be clear: Enbridge was fully prepared to absorb the market volatility because long-term Asian demand remained highly lucrative. Who canceled the Northern Gateway pipeline was not a boardroom executive staring at a temporary price dip. Capital was ready to flow. Regulatory uncertainty and unmitigated legal risks are what scared the investors, turning a high-stakes energy play into a toxic asset.

The overlooked catalyst: Institutional risk mismanagement

Corporate arrogance frequently masquerades as strategic planning. Enbridge executives operated under an outdated twentieth-century playbook, assuming that a green light from Ottawa's National Energy Board would automatically translate into compliance on the ground. Which explains why they treated indigenous engagement as a public relations box to check rather than a process of securing free, prior, and informed consent. They fundamentally miscalculated the shifting legal landscape of Canadian resource development.

The fatal geopolitical misstep

The company focused heavily on securing right-of-way agreements along the pipeline route through inland British Columbia. As a result: they completely underestimated the fierce, unified resistance of the coastal maritime nations who feared a devastating tanker spill in the Great Bear Rainforest. Why build a pipeline to a coast where you cannot safely load a ship? Enbridge secured agreements with some inland communities, but the coastal blockade remained absolute. (The company essentially bought the front door but forgot that the driveway was completely blocked by a sheer cliff.) This geographical and social disconnect meant that even if Ottawa shouted its approval from the rooftops, the actual marine terminal at Kitimat was a logistical fantasy.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did the federal tanker ban officially kill the pipeline?

Yes, the formalization of the Oil Tanker Moratorium Act acted as the final nail in the coffin, legally preventing crude vessels from docking at British Columbia's northern ports. Trudeau used this legislative tool to fulfill a 2015 campaign promise, effectively ensuring that even if Enbridge resurrected its legal permits, it could never export bitumen from Kitimat. The moratorium restricted vessels carrying more than 12,500 metric tons of crude oil from navigating the Hecate Strait, Dixon Entrance, and Queen Charlotte Sound. This specific legislative boundary neutralized the economic purpose of the entire 1,177-kilometer twin pipeline system. Consequently, who canceled the Northern Gateway pipeline becomes a question answered by a combination of court rulings and this targeted federal shipping ban.

How much money did Enbridge lose when the project was terminated?

The financial wreckage of the project cancellation cost Enbridge and its standard partners an estimated 373 million Canadian dollars in pre-development expenditures. The energy giant had spent over a decade navigating the regulatory labyrinth, funding environmental assessments, and attempting to secure engineering blueprints. When the federal cabinet formally rejected the project in November 2016, the company was forced to write off these massive accumulated regulatory costs during their subsequent financial quarters. Investors absorbed the blow, and the company quickly pivoted its capital toward the Line 3 replacement project and the expansion of the controversial Trans Mountain system. This financial loss serves as a stark historical warning that regulatory approval in Canada is never guaranteed, regardless of how much capital a corporation injects into lobbying.

Could a change in government resurrect the Northern Gateway route?

The geopolitical reality of British Columbia makes any future resurrection of this specific corridor politically and logistically impossible. Any politician promising to revive the dead project is selling a fantasy because the legal precedents established during the dispute have rewritten the rules of Canadian resource extraction. First Nations opposition along the northern coast has only solidified over the last decade, backed by powerful legal victories and international declarations. Furthermore, the economic landscape has shifted toward decarbonization and alternative energy infrastructure, making a greenfield bitumen pipeline an incredibly hard sell for international financiers. The issue remains that the social license required for this specific route evaporated completely, and no corporate board would risk billions trying to revive a project with such a toxic legacy.

The final verdict on the pipeline collapse

We must stop looking for a single villain in this industrial tragedy and recognize that the project died because it was an obsolete idea trying to survive in a modern legal reality. Who canceled the Northern Gateway pipeline was a collective alignment of indigenous legal power, judicial independence, and shifting federal political calculations. The federal court pulled the trigger, Trudeau refused to perform CPR, and Enbridge provided the defective blueprint. It is naive to think a corporation can bulldoze its way through unceded territory in the twenty-first century without genuine partnership. This saga proved that the path to the Pacific Ocean for Canadian heavy crude cannot be paved through judicial shortcuts or political favoritism. Because in the end, true sustainability and legal compliance are not optional hurdles; they are the bedrock of modern infrastructure.

💡 Key Takeaways

  • Is 6 a good height? - The average height of a human male is 5'10". So 6 foot is only slightly more than average by 2 inches. So 6 foot is above average, not tall.
  • Is 172 cm good for a man? - Yes it is. Average height of male in India is 166.3 cm (i.e. 5 ft 5.5 inches) while for female it is 152.6 cm (i.e. 5 ft) approximately.
  • How much height should a boy have to look attractive? - Well, fellas, worry no more, because a new study has revealed 5ft 8in is the ideal height for a man.
  • Is 165 cm normal for a 15 year old? - The predicted height for a female, based on your parents heights, is 155 to 165cm. Most 15 year old girls are nearly done growing. I was too.
  • Is 160 cm too tall for a 12 year old? - How Tall Should a 12 Year Old Be? We can only speak to national average heights here in North America, whereby, a 12 year old girl would be between 13

❓ Frequently Asked Questions

1. Is 6 a good height?

The average height of a human male is 5'10". So 6 foot is only slightly more than average by 2 inches. So 6 foot is above average, not tall.

2. Is 172 cm good for a man?

Yes it is. Average height of male in India is 166.3 cm (i.e. 5 ft 5.5 inches) while for female it is 152.6 cm (i.e. 5 ft) approximately. So, as far as your question is concerned, aforesaid height is above average in both cases.

3. How much height should a boy have to look attractive?

Well, fellas, worry no more, because a new study has revealed 5ft 8in is the ideal height for a man. Dating app Badoo has revealed the most right-swiped heights based on their users aged 18 to 30.

4. Is 165 cm normal for a 15 year old?

The predicted height for a female, based on your parents heights, is 155 to 165cm. Most 15 year old girls are nearly done growing. I was too. It's a very normal height for a girl.

5. Is 160 cm too tall for a 12 year old?

How Tall Should a 12 Year Old Be? We can only speak to national average heights here in North America, whereby, a 12 year old girl would be between 137 cm to 162 cm tall (4-1/2 to 5-1/3 feet). A 12 year old boy should be between 137 cm to 160 cm tall (4-1/2 to 5-1/4 feet).

6. How tall is a average 15 year old?

Average Height to Weight for Teenage Boys - 13 to 20 Years
Male Teens: 13 - 20 Years)
14 Years112.0 lb. (50.8 kg)64.5" (163.8 cm)
15 Years123.5 lb. (56.02 kg)67.0" (170.1 cm)
16 Years134.0 lb. (60.78 kg)68.3" (173.4 cm)
17 Years142.0 lb. (64.41 kg)69.0" (175.2 cm)

7. How to get taller at 18?

Staying physically active is even more essential from childhood to grow and improve overall health. But taking it up even in adulthood can help you add a few inches to your height. Strength-building exercises, yoga, jumping rope, and biking all can help to increase your flexibility and grow a few inches taller.

8. Is 5.7 a good height for a 15 year old boy?

Generally speaking, the average height for 15 year olds girls is 62.9 inches (or 159.7 cm). On the other hand, teen boys at the age of 15 have a much higher average height, which is 67.0 inches (or 170.1 cm).

9. Can you grow between 16 and 18?

Most girls stop growing taller by age 14 or 15. However, after their early teenage growth spurt, boys continue gaining height at a gradual pace until around 18. Note that some kids will stop growing earlier and others may keep growing a year or two more.

10. Can you grow 1 cm after 17?

Even with a healthy diet, most people's height won't increase after age 18 to 20. The graph below shows the rate of growth from birth to age 20. As you can see, the growth lines fall to zero between ages 18 and 20 ( 7 , 8 ). The reason why your height stops increasing is your bones, specifically your growth plates.